tisdag 6 oktober 2020

Peace without victory

Some European nations (such as the French or the Poles) share many historical episodes with the Armenians. However, it is also possible to point to other moments from centuries ago, when the same nations had special, even allied relations with the Turks. But can this determine contemporary geopolitics? Of course not, because these are events from the past, of course, to be used for propaganda and to influence emotions, if concious European policy required them to be stimulated, whether for cooperation with Armenia or Turkey. However, such episodes must by no means determine the establishment of today's and future intrests. Sentiments are tools, not determiants of politics.

Meanwhile, in the entire Karabakh crisis, there are too many emotions, screams, and propaganda. So much that it brings to mind another state and nation, which forces obedience to its reasons by shouting and moral blackmail. Especially that while browsing the superficially excited pro-Armenian Internet, isn't it striking how similar Armenian propaganda is to the Israeli one? The same emotionality, the same tone of "historical justice", threatening with "another holocaust", and invoking "thousands years old rights to lands" (the more absurd that also thousands of years ago, Armenians left Transcaucasia, spreading over the entire ancient and medieval Middle East, and the areas of Karabakh were re-populated by them only in the 1870s, with the support of the Russian authorities, but also with the consent of Azeri and Lezgin peoples, who were then the hosts of these lands). Sure, it is interesting that someone has finally decided to plagiarize the masters of propaganda, but not yet a reason to succumb to these tricks. Both for copies and for the original.

There Are No Saints In Geopolitics. Facts defend against one-sided perception of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Let’s remember 25 February 1992, when Armenian troops encircled the town of Xocalı, where then stayed over 4,000 refugees from the rest of the Karabakh, being cleared of Azeris, Turks, and Lezgins. Although the Armenians agree to the evacuation of the city, they then attacked the refugee column. During the all-night raid organized by the Armenians, and then mass executions, 613 people were murdered, including 106 women and 83 Azerbaijani children. In fact, this war was and is terrible. And it is not true that one side was only sacred and the other only genocidal. The only way to end this nightmare is through a permanent peace based on compromise. And as it happens with compromises, both fighting nations will probably be dissatisfied with it. But thanks to this, it can and must prove to be permanent. Peace without victory. This is the only possible scenario for Karabakh and the entire South Caucasus.

Unfortunately, the de-escalation of the conflict is made more difficult by the seemingly incomprehensible actions of Armenia. The attack on Ganja is an obvious attempt to bring the conflict out of Karabakh, provoke Baku to retaliate on the territory of Armenia, and thus lead to a casus belli within the meaning of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Yerevan plays with matches all the time, crying to the whole world that is burned. The question is what for? After all, no one is calling for a repeat of the pogroms of Armenians (or anyone else). The thing is, however, that everyone can feel sympathy for whomever they wish to, but no European interest makes us engage in this conflict at all, including on the side of Armenia. On the contrary, in the interests of Europe, for several reasons, there is rather a lasting peace in the Transcaucasia, and this is not possible without concessions from both sides, especially Yerevan/Stepanakert, which must finally withdraw from at least part of the buffer zone, and Armenians also perfectly know it.


In turn, pacification is a task that may, and even must, check the reality of the Astana triangle. Of course, it was created and worked to solve completely different issues (Syrian and more broadly Middle Eastern), but this is how it happens that life suggests new tasks for proven formats. For while Russia's leading role in the negotiation process is recognized especially by Azerbaijan, but also by Armenia (although not necessarily honestly in Yerevan…), the events of this year have confirmed that both the Kazan formula and Lavrov's plan for the region are at an impasse. And this, in turn, means that Iran, a traditional ally of Armenia, but also having more than proper relations with Azerbaijan, should get involved in solving the problem, apart from Moscow and Ankara.

The key to peace in the Transcaucasus is therefore the Armenia-Azerbaijan-Iran-Russia-Turkey format, with the rejection of American-French meddling. It is therefore also a test, especially for Russian diplomacy, with the key question whether it will be able to break away with Westernisation sentiments and the completely unnecessary, even harmful to Moscow, tendency to build some concerts of powers only with Western states. Because having the key to the peace, it is also possible to open the door to power. And its sources are in Eurasia, not Euro-Atlantis.